Here's a series of tweets by a guy (Stanimir Dobrev) who seems to have some insight into the problems the Russian military is having. I don't know anything about him, but the tweets are an interesting read.
Tweets 1-25 were in response to the following tweet by Michael Kofman:
>>>Taking a cursory look at Russian losses two weeks into the war, it reads less as a general failure to modernize, and more as a failure to maintain and properly support the equipment. Abandonment rate exceedingly high.<<<
1) I am going to push back on the idea that what we see is that the Russian Armed Forces are merely having severe supply and readiness issues and that we should consider it to be overall modern.
2)Here's the first problem, SEAD [Suppression of Enemy Air Defense]. It's failing to suppress UA air defences, but that's more a feature of procurement planning rather than a bug. The VKS [Russian Aerospace Forces] lacks a significant number of modern ELINT [Electronic Intelligence] platforms.
3)Let's do a head count, 2 Tu-214Rs [reconnaissance aircraft] and 3 modernised Il-20 derivatives have been received in the last 20+ years. The A-100 projects is still being delayed and the reports from KAZ suggest further Tu-214 orders will not be forthcoming.
4)Now to explain the practical implications. Without those platforms in the air the Ru VKS rarely has an idea when a UA radar is being turned on unless they are almost on top of it in practical terms ( closer than 50 kms ). They just get notified when they get acquired.
5)The second issue is the collapse of communications and the lack of interoperable real time data links with the same standards. In practice the VDV, Army and VKS sort of have different systems. These get fed and combined at the army HQ usually during drills.
6)Firing anti radar missiles in a battle space you can't deconflict and is filled with your own AD is a bad idea, even if you think there's a caricature level casual carelessness among Ru officers (I don't think it's the case). You just lose missiles without achieving their aim.
7)The next issue is what modern means for ground forces and air forces. It is supposed to mean All Weather forces. But at the very least night operations, but the issue is the bulk of the Russian ground equipment has 70s IR illuminators for its commanders.
8)We have also seen Russian troops use flares during their attack of the nuclear powerplant in Energodar and lacking more sophisticated night fighting equipment. Even recent tank upgrades omitted that, like the T-80BVM.
9)When defining a modern tank we usually consider modern ammo (discrepancy in crew experience could negate it via outmanoeuvring) modern sights for the gunner, thermal equipped 360 periscope for the commander (hunter killer capability) and a battlefield information system.
10)Even though the Ru MoD considers most of its tanks as modern, in practice by the above standard only a small subset are. To tie it to experience from recent combat showcases that even the thermals on the Strykers can be used to avoid and counter ambushes.
11)The next bit is the VKS&AD procurement priorities, they are dominated by people with influence over the Kremlin, we see SHORAD development funding & some procurement funding and S-400 purchases. The issue is that this funding is greater or comparable to aircraft procurement.
12)This is an anomaly when it comes to modern air forces. As priority should go to various types of surveillance platforms, manned but also possible high endurance unmanned platforms , then strike and multiroles, then an operational budget for high training rates and then AD.
13)The inversion of that paradigm suggest that procurement is driven by Almaz-Antey and Rostech's funding needs and desires, rather than actual modern AF doctrine. The DoD Procurement slideshows may cause migraines, they don't cause inferiority by design to this degree.
14)And the other remaining problem is the issue with the continuous lack of JDAM equivalents. JDAM kits are cost effective, Russia just doesn't have a comparable program that has delivered kits at anywhere the same rate even if we account for a smaller fleet.
15)What I think
@KofmanMichael
might have been influenced by if I may paraphrase a document the Chieftain quoted in one of his talks, "The tendency to view the battlefield as a test agency". The use of Su-57, Mig-31 with Kinzhal [hypersonic missiles], UGVs [Unmanned Ground Vehicles] in Syria and so on.
16)But if we then go back to Ru MoD's overall experience with pre-production models we see that it's not really an indication for adoption or that these systems are anywhere as mature as the promotion materials suggest.
17)Armata [next generation Russian main battle tank] is still in trials, Kh-31 [air to surface missle] was adopted but then the Tu-22M3M [supersonic bomber] that was to carry it was cancelled, Project 855 sub [nuclear powered cruise missile sub] never being adopted but becoming a test bed for Project 855M. Even the Su-57 [next generation fighter jet] is being accepted with a planned re-engining amongst other systems being pending.
18)As a whole while the Russian armed forces don't have the ability to act as a modern force at this scope. If we're talking about a subset across most branches of a combined total of 40-50 k . Maybe. But a ground component of 200k with backing, as we have seen is a problem.
19)Finally, to reiterate when you're not picking just a company or three from a brigade to send, you get to see how unprepared the service is. That shouldn't be news at this point, tanks without motor oil, dead batteries, drivers who can't handle ditches with tracked vehicles...
20)My assessment of the current fighting is also different. I presume that the Ruforces in the South met more success due it being easier to support them Ru VKS(as I mentioned in a previous thread + UA AD focus on Kyiv). That pushed battered UA forces back behind the rivers.
21)The panic in Kyiv from days 1&2 has also led to more newly formed units being sent around the capitol. But because the Russian forces are so limited for their tasks in the South we just see small prongues which the remaining UA units are being able to check.
22)The constant fear of a landing in Odessa seems to have forced a lot more UA troops to be kept there than necessary. Again consistent with a less aggressive (in terms eagerness to go on the offensive of military action) civil government which got spooked at the start.
23)But overall we're seeing some mauled UA units still mounting an effective defence and a more conservative posture by UA and a southern Ru advance that captured a few bigger towns and stores, and thus doesn't have as a dire of a supply a situation, but it's facing problem 2.
24)The manpower isn't there to hold even 4 larger towns. As UA reserves are brought forth South and East I don't think Ru keeping thousands in the towns and a bunch advance columns trying to move out is tenable. Mass warcriming doesn't degrade mil power in 2 weeks.
25) In the words of Blackadder : It started badly, it tailed off a little in the middle and the less said about the end the better — but apart from that it was excellent.
