This is becoming tiresome, but I will nevertheless attempt to provide some facts about what actually happens at the USPTO. Please let me know if you are not interested in learning about what actually happens at the USPTO so I can stop wasting my time
You said the USPTO allows almost anything because they need the funds, yet assert that a rejection rate of 45% is "completely irrelevant."
Here's your actual statement: "Referring to the number of applications approved by percentage is completely irrelevant."
Let's test this assertion with a hypothetical. If the USPTO rejected 100% of all patent applications that are filed, would it still be true that "they (sic) [the USPTO] allow almost anything" and this is "because . . . no grant, no money to fund the USPTO"?
You said: "Given a patent application where the examiner is on the fence, what do you expect he would do?"
This is extremely simple. They will reject it. Rejection carries very little downside risk for an examiner (provided it is a reasonable rejection).
If you want to know what actually happens at the USPTO, please read the following:
https://www.globalipmatters.com/2017/12/04/patent-quality-chat-how-is-a-uspto-examiners-work-product-reviewed
From the article:
"Providing the Technology Center perspective, Supervisor Christyann Pulliam noted that each examiner has a performance appraisal plan (PAP) which sets forth standards for performance. These standards are based on the examiner’s government scale (GS) level or pay grade and increase with grade. Examples of PAP quality elements include analyzing disclosure and claims for compliance with 35 USC 112 (GS 5 through 15), properly rejecting all rejectable claims in a final rejection (GS 14 and 15), and properly allowing all claims in an allowance (GS 14 and 15)."
Also, examiners are represented by a union:
http://www.popa.org/
The performance of examiners is largely determined based on a count system:
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/patent-examiner-count-system
If you want to learn about what actually happens at the USPTO, I encourage you to read the article entitled "PUTTING YOURSELF IN THE SHOES OF A PATENT EXAMINER: OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO) PATENT EXAMINER PRODUCTION (COUNT) SYSTEM"
https://repository.jmls.edu/ripl/vol17/iss1/2/
From the article: "Although examiners are evaluated based on the quality or errors that are later
found in their work, quality of the examiner’s work is a smaller component [35%] of their performance measurement, than production and docket management combined." In other words, 65% of an Examiner's performance evaluation is based on production quantity under the count system.
First, do you really believe that an examiner will receive a poor performance review if the examiner rejects an application in a manner that is consistent with the examination guidelines issued by the USPTO? Do you really believe that the USPTO issues examination guidelines, but secretly issues poor performance reviews if examiners follow the examination guidelines? Do you believe that POPA would look the other way? What do you believe actually happens at the USPTO?
Second, please read Table 3 of the jmls article (if you are not willing to educate yourself, I'm not willing to discuss this any further). "Final" means a final Office Action (i.e. a final rejection). In other words, examiners get productivity points for a final REJECTION. An examiner gets .25 counts for a final. In other words, the examiner is given a productivity reward for a final rejection. "All/Abn" means an allowance or abandonment. As you can see, an examiner gets exactly the same credit (.5 counts) for an abandonment as he does for an allowance.
Do you really believe that examiners do not follow the examination guidelines as they are required to do, but rather make their decisions based on a fear that a rejection will result in less fee revenue for the USPTO? All I can say is that this is a rather incredible belief.
Let's agree for purposes of discussion that the USPTO is underfunded (and that allowing applications somehow solves this). If examiners are actually highly concerned about this as you seem to believe, why don't they just issue first Office Action allowances in almost every case? I encourage you to look at Figure 2 of the Yale Journal article I cited in my prior post (Once again, if you are not interested in learning about what actually happens at the USPTO, please let me know so I can stop wasting my time). As you can see from Figure 2, the first Office Action allowances are issued in only about 10% of applications, and the trend has been down. Why don't examiners just allow all (or almost all) applications in the first Office Action? The USPTO would collect the issue fees right away, and it would greatly reduce the workload on examiners so it would relieve the alleged underfunding problem.
This leads to yet another issue with respect to your assertions. Here's your original statement: "no grant, no money to fund the USPTO." At the time an examiner is examining an application, the USPTO has already collected the filing fees. You could not have meant that the examiner is worried that no one will file applications in the future if he rejects any given application because you later asserted that: "Referring to the number of applications approved by percentage is completely irrelevant. The USPTO has no method or means to control application volume, therefore it's a moving goalpost." Thus, in your view, the USPTO has "no method or means to control application volume" and an examiner could not be worried about losing his job.
I would encourage you to read the USPTO fee schedule:
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule (once again, if you are not interested in learning about what actually happens at the USPTO, please let me know so I can stop wasting my time). I'll use large entity fees for purposes of discussion, but the same basic principles apply for all entities.
After an examiner issues a final rejection, one of three things is likely to happen. First, the applicant can file a Notice of Appeal. The fee for a Notice of Appeal is $800. This is a quick $800 the USPTO collects for almost no work. Applicant must then file an appeal brief and pay a forwarding fee of $2,000. The second thing that is likely to happen is that the applicant will file an RCE. The fee for a first RCE is $1,200 and the fee for a second RCE is $1,700. In other words, the USPTO collects additional fees if an RCE is filed. The third thing that can happen is that the application may be abandoned. This of course does not generate fees for the USPTO, but it also relieves the USPTO of any additional work (other than sending a Notice of Abandonment). The issue fees are $960.
Given the actual fee schedule, do you really believe that examiners allow patent applications because they are worried that the USPTO will not collect the $960 issue fee if the examiner rejects an application?
You do realize that USPTO funding (i.e. fees) are set by the Adminstration? (
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/05/23/uspto-3-6-billion-presidents-fy-2018-budget-avoids-fee-diversion/id=83633/). Fees are adjusted to cover projected costs (
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/performance-and-planning/budget-and-financial-information). As I understand it, you seem to believe that the USPTO sets fees that are too low, and then ignores the law and it's own examination guidelines so it can make up the shortfall resulting from the fees it set for itself in some sort of crazy giant shell game.
Do you really believe that an individual examiner will be so concerned that $3.6 billion in fees will not be sufficient that he will ignore the USPTO examination guidelines and allow an application that should be rejected so that the USPTO could potentially get an extra $960 in issue fees?
To me, this seems preposterous.
Let's also assume for purposes of discussion that all foreign countries reject every single patent application that is filed. How would this support your assertion that:
"they (sic) [the USPTO] allow almost anything . . . because . . . no grant, no money to fund the USPTO"? How do foreign laws and foreign patent examination show that the U.S. Patent Office allows almost anything?
You appear to believe that the actual allowance rate at the USPTO is "completely irrelevant" yet you also believe that the laws in foreign countries are somehow highly probative with respect to your assertion that the USPT will allow almost anything because the USPT needs the fees.
Your logic completely escapes me.